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In the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah
DOUBLE "D" AMUSEMENT
)
COMPANY, a Corporation,
Plaintiff and 0 ~dent
.. ""'""'l'V
' \
vs.
f
'

CASE
NO. 10938

WILLIAM B. HAWKINS,
\
Defendant and Appellant. ,

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
NATURE OF CASE

This is an action for breach of a conrtract by the terms
of which appellant was to have permitted respondent to
place an automatic music vending machine on appellant's
business premises, in consideration for which appellant was
to receive a percentage of the gross receipts of the machine.
DISPOSmON OF CASE IN WWER COURT

The respondent agrees with the appellant's statement
of the disposition of the case in the lower court.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent seeks to have the judgment of the
trial court sustain€d contending that there was adequate
evidence to support the finding of the court with respect
to damages.
STA1.'EMENT OF FACTS
Respondent corporation, plaintiff below, is engaged in
the business of operating amusement machines (record
players, pinball machines, etc.) on locations in various restaurants and taverns. In exchange for the right to place
its machines upon the premises respondent pays over a
fixed pe:ricentage of the gross receipts of each machine to
the owner or operator of the premises.
On October 16, 1963, respondent entered into such a
contract with appellant as owner and operator of the L-Roy
Tavern and Lounge in Orem, Utah. Pursuant to the con·
tract respondent placed an automatic record player on
appellant's premises. For a period of approximately eight
months the parties shared the gross revenues of the ma·
chine, dividing them equally.
On or about July 1, 1964, appellant wrongfully ,
breached the contract by removing the machine from his
business premises. The fact of appellant's liability for
such breach is not an issue in this appeal.
After the initial trial, at which appellant's liability
was established, a new trial was granted by the court pri·
marily on the issue of damages. At the new trial the testimony and exhibits received at the first trial were treated
as again being before the court, pursuant to stipulation of
of counsel and ruling of the court (R. 135-136).
At the fin,'"1: trial evidence had been received of the
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exclusively to the operation of the machine in question.
A case directly in point which commends itself by the
clarity and brevity of its analysis is King Features Syndicate v. Courrier, 241 Iowa 870, 43 N.W. 2d 718, 41 ALR2d
467. (1950). The case involved a contract similar to that
in the instant case by which plaintiff was to install its
printer telegraph machines in defendant's premises and
defendant was to pay $10.00 a week for news reports .received over the machines. Defendant breached the agr~
ment before the machines were installed. Holdmg- that
the measure of plaintiff's damages was the gross receipts
which plaintiff would have received, less the "cost of obtaining them" the court further held that:
"
. the cost of performance figure, used to diminish the gross payments due, did not need to include
what might be termed the overhead or fixed expenses
as argued by defendants. The record shows such
items of expense would be constant whether this contract was performed or not. This being true, they
were of no interest on the question of damages for
nonperformanoe.
In answering a similar argument to that presented
by the defendants here, the court in Oakland California

Towel Co. v. Sivils, supra, said: ". . the true rule
seems to be that the prospective profits should be
diminished by charges composing an essential element
in the cost of manufacture, or, as in this case, of service. Essential elements in such cost do not include
remorte costs, overhead or otherwise, but are confined
to expenditures that would necessarily have been made
in the performance of the contract. The only matter of concern is the detriment suffered or benefit lost
as the result of the breach. If the fixed expen.ses nei-
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ther increased or decreased as a consequence of the
nonperformance of the contract, there would be no
loss or benefit arising from that factor." (52 Cal App2d
517, 126 P2d 652.) 41 ALR 2d 476.
Respondent's witness Arvid Dodge, a certified public
accountant, after stating that he would exclude fixed costs
of the business as a whole in determining loss of profits
resulting from the breach testified as foll()IWs:
"Q. (By Mr. Howard) Can you tell us why you
think that would be the more acceptable calculation,
based upon accounting practice?
A. Yes. The expenses incurred by the Corporation during this period would go on whether or not
his machine was actually in use, with one or two ex·
ceptions: repairs and maintenance, autom01bile ex·
pense, which undoubtedly would have been greater
had this machine b€en in operation.
But we have a machine here, that through obsolescence, if northing else, depreciation would continue,
advertising would continue, wages would continue. All
of these expenses incurred and sp2nt by the Corporation would continue whether or not this machine ,
brought in revenue. Therefo:ri2, in this computation
I have tried to take the overall net income deficiency
and deduct just those additional expenses that would
ordinarily~which would have occured had this ma·
chine been in operation for this period of time." (R.
113).
The testimony of Dodge in this particular was uncon·
tradicted. This case is thus clearly within the reasoning
of the King Features case, and the coW't correctly meas. ured respondent's loss of prof.its by deducting from gross
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gross rece1pts of the machine in question for the eight
months' period it was in operation on appellant's premises
( R. 135) . From this evidence the court was a:ble to determine by simple arithmetical calculation the average
monthly gross receipts of the machine (R. 122) and the
projected gross receipts for the life of the contract (Memorandum Decision, March 17, 1967).
At the second trial evidence was received as to :respondent' s costs of doing business (R. 106-111, 127-131;
Exhibits A-3, A-4). These costs fall into two categories:
(a) Those general costs which enter into the calculation
of net income of the corporation and (b) that part of the
general costs in category (a) which relate exclusively to
the particular machine which is part of the subject matter
of th1s litigation, e.g., depreciation of the machine, maintenance costs, etc. These latter costs in category (b) were
necessarily estimated costs over the life of the contract
since the contract was terminated by defendant's breach
after eight months of operation. The phrase, "she1er guess
work", applied by counsel for appellant to these calculations (R. 108) is therefore inaccurate. The calculations
were the work of a skilled certified public accountant and
based largely upon accepted depreciation schedules (R.
p. 106).
On the basis of this evidence the court calculated respondent's share ($4,050.00) of the projected gross revenue
for the life of the contract and determined the damage
to respO!Ildent by subtracting therefrom the projected costs
in category (b) above for the life of the contract ($2,150.00) and respondent's receipts for the first eight months
($567.25). The calculation of the court as found in its
Memorandum iDecision is as follows:
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"In this case the court finds the issues in favor f
the plaintiff and against the defendant and finds th~t
the gro.ss revenue from the music machine in defendant's place of business amountfd to $67.50 per month·
that for a five-year p2riod this would indicate total
gross revenue of $4050.00, to which the plaintiff would
be entitled; that the sum of $567.00 was paid from the
machine in cash to the plaintiff leaving a balance to
recover of $3,482.75; that the cost of operation for the
five-year period would amount to $2,150.00, resulting
in a loss of net revenue to the plaintiff of $1,332.75,
for which it is entitled to judgment."
Respondent believes that the figure of $2,150.00 for cost
of operation is over-stated. (Compare Exhibit A-3.) In
the interest of terminating this litigation, however, respondent is willing to accept the trial court's figure.
ARGUMENT

POINT I
THE TRUE MEASURE OF RESPONDENT'S DAM·
AGE FOR LOSS OF PROFITS FROM THE MACIITNE
IN QUESTION IS ARRIVED AT BY DEDUCTING PRO·
JECTE)D COSTS ATTRIBUTABLE TO THAT MACHINE
ONLY FROM RESPONDENT'S SHARE OF THE MA·
CHINE'S PROJECTED GROSS REVENUE FOR THE
CONTRACT PERIOD.
The principal question raised on appeal is whether in
dete1mining damages for loss of profits from operation of
the machine the trial court must subtract a pro rata share
of the costs attributable to all 83 machines, the operation
of which cC!nstitutes respondent's business, or rather if the
court need only subtract .thqse direct costs attributable
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receipts only those costs exclusively attributable to the
machine in question.

POINT Il
THERE WAS COMPETENT EVIDENCE FROM
WHICH THIE TRIAL COURT COULD iDETERMINE RESPONDENT'S LOSS OF PROFITS, RESULTING FROM
APPELLANT'S BREACH.
That "damages cannot be found from mere speculative and conjectural evidence" (Bunnell v. Bills, 13 U1:Jah
2d 83, 368 P2d 597, 602 (1962) ) is a sound and well established principle of law which respondent does not here dispute. A corollary principle, equally well established, is
stated by this Court as follows:
Where the plaintiff has shown actual loss of business during the period as a result of defendant's breach.
of contmct, he will not be denied recovery because the
exact amount of damage cannot readily be ascertained.
Gould v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 6 Utah 2d
187, 309 P2d 802, 805 (1957); and see numerous cases
cited at footnote 3.
The rule against speculative and conjectural evidence
of damages is directed to evidence of the fact rather than
evidence of the extent of damage:
Courts indicate that there is a distinction between
the quality of proof ne:::essary to establish the fact
that the plainrtiff has sustained some damage and the
measure of proof necessary to enable the jury to fix
the amount. Although formerly the tendency was to
restrict the recovery to such matters as were susceptible of having attached to them an exact pecuniary
value, it is now generally held that the uncertainty
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which prevents a recovery is uncertainty as to the
fact of the damage and not as to its amount and that
where it is reasonably certain that damage has resulted, mere uncertainty as to the amount will not preclude the right of recovery or prevent a jury decision
awarding damages. This view has been sustained
where, from the nature of the case, the extent of the
injury and the amount of damage are not capable of
exact and accurate proof. Under such circumstances,
all that can be required is that the evidence-with such
certainty as the nature of the particular case may permit-lay a foundation which will enable the trier of
facts to make a fair and reasonable estimate of the
amount of damage. The plaintiff will not be denied
a substantial recovery if he has produced the best evidence available and it is sufficient to afford a reasonable basis for estimating his loss. 22 Am Jur 2d 44,
Damages Sec. 25; Gould case, supra, 309 P2d at 805-6.
In the case at bar there was clear and precise evidence
before the trial court of the exact amount of gross receipts
from the machine for the eight months' period prior to appellant's breach. On the entirely reasonable assumption
that average monthly revenue from the machine would
remain constant for the remaining life of the contract, the
trial court was able to determine the projected gross profits of respondent for the life of the contract. It is not
understood that appellant disputes this assumption.
further, there was clear evidence as to the estimated
costs of operation attributable to the machine in question
for the life of the contract. These costs are by their very
nature estimates.. Appellant cannot breach his contract
and then be heard to say that b8'cause the contract was not
performed respondent's costs and therefore its damages
are uncertain and unrecoverabie. Respondent's Exhibit
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A-3 constituted adequate evidence of costs related to operation of the machine. The figures as to depreciation were
arrived at in conformity with accepted accounting practice
(Record, page 6) and those relating to maintenance and
service costs were developed by dividing the actual costs
for the business as a whole by the number of machines
operated by the business (R. 109-111).
It is, 1Jherefore, apparent that while the evidentiary
dart.a from which respondent's loss of profits was calculated
were estimated data, they were in no sense speculative,
conjectural or "mere guess work". Rather, they represent
rational extrapolations from known facts in accordance
with sound accounting practice.
CONCLUSION

Respondent is confident that this Honorable Court will
act with wise restraint according to its settled rule that in
the absence of abuse of his discretion "the question of excessive verdict must rest within the sound discretion of the
trial judge . . ." Gould Case, supra, 309 P2d at 807.
Respondent urges that the verdict be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
HOWARD AND LEWIS
JACKON B. HOWARD
Attorneys for Appellant
120 East 300 North
Provo, Utah

